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Summary
Perception and action are governed not only by sensory
information but also by prior predictions about sensory
events. These sensory predictions allow one to react more
rapidly to predictable information in the environment [1]
and to perceptually distinguish self-produced and externally
produced sensations [2–6]. In order to be accurate, however,
all sensory predictions need continuous recalibration to
match the changing properties of the environment, the
sensorimotor system, or both. Earlier studies showed that
the cerebellum is crucial for the recalibration of sensory
predictions capturing the sensory consequences of one’s
motor behavior [5, 7]. Herewe askedwhether the cerebellum,
a structure intimately linked to plasticity within the motor
domain [8–13], also accounts for the recalibration of sensory
predictions about external sensory eventswithin the percep-
tual domain in a nonmotor task. Cerebellar patients and
healthy controlswere equally able to predict the time of reap-
pearance of a moving target that temporarily disappeared
behind an occluder. However, patients were significantly
impaired in recalibrating this spatiotemporal prediction to
account for an experimentally added delay. This suggests
that the cerebellum plays a domain-general role in fine
tuning predictive models.Results
Sensory information alone is not sufficient for producing reli-
able perception and behavior. Instead, the brain also forms
‘‘sensory predictions’’ based on prior information and general-
ized knowledge about the likely outcome given a certain situ-
ation [14–17]. For example, when emptying a ketchup bottle
by hitting it with one’s hand, the other hand, which holds the
bottle, generates sufficient grip force to compensate the
self-generated hitting load without delay. Mechanisms driven
purely by sensory feedback are too slow to allow such motor
compensation, which hencemust rely on predictive processes
building on efferent motor commands [16, 17]. Similarly, to
perceptually estimate whether a car might cross one’s way
and to react in time, the sensorimotor system would benefit
from predicting the car’s upcoming movement based on
afferent sensory input [18]. In order to be accurate, however,
sensory predictions need constant recalibration to match the*Correspondence: manueljanroth@gmail.com (M.J.R.), a.lindner@medizin.
uni-tuebingen.de (A.L.)ever-changing properties of one’s sensorimotor system and
environment [3, 13]. Such recalibration is needed irrespective
of whether sensory predictions are related to motor behavior,
perception, or both. But which brain structure is responsible
for recalibrating sensory predictions?
In agreement with the role of the cerebellum in processing
and adapting motor-related information [8–12, 19–21], we
and others have demonstrated that the cerebellum is needed
to optimize self-action and self-action perception by recali-
brating predictions capturing the sensory consequences
of one’s actions [5, 7, 9]. Given the high share of connections
between the cerebellum and cerebrocortical areas not directly
related tomotor behavior, and given the accumulating number
of reports implying cerebellar contributions beyond the
motor domain [22, 23], we hypothesized that the cerebellum
might additionally be needed for recalibrating predictions
exclusively related to the perceptual domain, i.e., even in the
absence of self-action. If true, this would support a domain-
general role of the cerebellum in recalibrating predictive
models.
To test our hypothesis, we conducted a ‘‘baseline’’ and a
‘‘recalibration’’ experiment estimating, respectively, subjects’
ability to use sensory predictions perceptually and to keep
these predictions precisely tuned. The study included 15 cere-
bellar patients (see Table S1 available online) and 15 age-
matched controls with no neurological or psychiatric disorders
(Supplemental Experimental Procedures). All subjects gave
written informed consent according to the Declaration of
Helsinki prior to the experiment, and the study was approved
by the local ethics committee. Subjects’ performance de-
pended on the spatiotemporal prediction of a sensory event,
namely, the time of reappearance of a moving target. During
each trial, a visual target moved from left to right on a monitor
and disappeared in the middle of its trajectory behind an
occluder (Figure 1A). Although the speed of the visual target
was always constant (w16/s), the time it needed to pass
behind the occluder was manipulated across trials. Subjects
were instructed to constantly fixate a central fixation cross in
the middle of the occluder and to decide whether the reap-
pearance of the target at the right side of the occluder was
‘‘too early’’ or ‘‘too late,’’ assuming that it maintained constant
speed (Figure 1A). Using this procedure, we aimed at probing
a spatiotemporal sensory prediction exclusively within the
perceptual domain.
In the baseline experiment, we assessed subjects’ ability
to accurately predict the time of target reappearance. We
investigated subjects’ perceptual reports while varying the
difference between the actual and the theoretical reappear-
ance time (200 ms; Figure 1B). This difference Dt was equally
distributed over 6180 ms. Figure 2A depicts the course of
a typical baseline experiment as well as the related fitted
psychometric function, plotting the probability of ‘‘too late’’
responses as a function of Dt. The reliability of each subject’s
sensory predictions was estimated using two measures
derived from the corresponding psychometric functions. First,
we estimated the point of subjective equivalence (PSE) be-
tween predicted and actual Dt. At the PSE, subjects perceive
the target reappearance as ‘‘right on time’’ and thus respond
Figure 1. Experimental Task Design
(A) A visual target (red bar) moved from the left side of the stimulus screen
to the right. In the middle of its movement trajectory (middle panel), it disap-
peared under an opaque occluder. The speed of the target (w16/s) was
always constant when the target was visible. However, the time the target
needed to pass the occluder was varied experimentally. After the target
had reappeared at the right end of the occluder, subjects had to manually
indicate whether the target had reappeared ‘‘too early’’ or ‘‘too late,’’ given
its constant speed.
(B) The time of target reappearance Dt was varied relative to the duration
the target would need to pass the occluder when moving at constant speed
(i.e., 200ms, middle target trajectory). NegativeDt (left exemplary trajectory)
denotes that the target reappeared earlier as compared to a continuous
movement with constant speed, whereas positive Dt (right trajectory) de-
notes that the target reappeared later.
Figure 2. Results of an Exemplary Control Subject
(A) In the baseline experiment, the levels of Dt were equally distributed
across trials, ranging between 6180 ms, as shown in the upper panel.
Triangles pointing upward represent ‘‘too late’’ responses; triangles point-
ing downward represent ‘‘too early’’ responses. The lower panel exhibits
the corresponding probability of ‘‘too late’’ responses for a given Dt. The
fit of the psychometric function indicates a baseline point of subjective
equivalence (bPSE at Ptoo late = 0.5) of Dt = 54 ms and a just noticeable
difference (JND) of Dt = 52 ms.
(B) In the recalibration experiment, the target reappeared 100 ms later than
the bPSE (i.e., Dt = 154 ms for this subject) in 50% of trials, namely in the so-
called recalibration trials (dark gray triangles). The remaining 50% of
randomly interleaved probe trials were used to calculate the actual point
of subjective equivalence (recalibration point of subjective equivalence;
rPSE). Eighty percent of these probe trials were PEST trials (light gray trian-
gles) in which Dt was governed by an adaptive staircase procedure (PEST)
that approximated the PSE. Twenty percent of probe trials were ‘‘easy’’
trials (brown triangles) with Dts above the perceptual threshold. Recalibra-
tion trials induced a rightward shift of the corresponding psychometric
function, resulting in an rPSE of 176 ms (lower panel).
For further information on the different trial types and the calculation of
the psychometric function, see Supplemental Experimental Procedures.
For all individual subjects’ PSEs, see Figure S1.
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93150% ‘‘too early’’ and 50% ‘‘too late’’ across trials. Second, we
assessed the just noticeable difference (JND) for changes
in Dt. The JND was defined as the difference in Dt between
the PSE and a hit rate of 75%. Importantly, the quality of the
underlying psychometric fit to the data (quantified by resid-
uals) did not differ between groups [baseline: t(24) = 1.37,
p = 0.18; recalibration: t(27) = 0.94, p = 0.36].
In the baseline experiment, the mean Dt at the PSE (bPSE)
was 576 10 ms in cerebellar patients and 306 9 ms in healthy
controls (Figure 3A), indicating that both groups slightly over-
estimated the time the target needed to pass the occluder.
Across groups, the bPSE was not significantly different
[t(28) = 21.90, p = 0.07; t test]. The JND was also not signifi-
cantly different between groups (z =20.19, p = 0.85; Wilcoxon
rank-sum test). It amounted to a median value of 55 ms
(Q1 = 49 ms, Q3 = 79 ms) in patients and 55 ms (Q1 = 51 ms,
Q3 = 64 ms) in controls (Figure 3B).
In the recalibration experiment, the target reappeared
100 ms after individual’s baseline PSE in half of the trials
(‘‘recalibration trials’’). The remainder of the randomly inter-
leaved trials was used to estimate the recalibrated PSE(rPSE; Figure 2B). If recalibration trials induced an updating
of the time of predicted target reappearance, this should
lead to a rightward shift of the psychometric function as
Figure 3. Group Results of Patients and Controls
(A) The baseline point of subjective equivalence
(bPSE) was not significantly different between
groups, although patients exhibited a slightly
larger bPSE (mean: controls 30 ms, patients
57 ms). Error bars indicate 6SEM.
(B) The just noticeable difference (JND), as a
measure of perceptual accuracy, did not show a
significant difference between both groups (me-
dian 55 ms in both groups). This indicates that
both groups were equally able to form accurate
sensory predictions. Error bars indicate the inter-
quartile range.
(C) Recalibration, i.e., the difference between
rPSE and bPSE, showed a highly significant
difference (p = 0.002) between groups, indi-
cating an impairment of cerebellar patients in
recalibrating their sensory predictions (mean:
controls 120 ms, patients 52 ms). Error bars indi-
cate 6SEM.
For group results after exclusion of possible
outliers, see Figure S2.
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932compared to baseline, and thus to a higher rPSE. This shift is
illustrated in Figure 2 for a control subject. The corresponding
increase in rPSE as compared to the bPSE suggests recalibra-
tion of a sensory prediction in this subject (also see Figure S1).
As a group, controls changed their sensory prediction in
the recalibration experiment: compared to an average bPSE
of 30 6 9 ms, the mean of the rPSEs increased to 150 6
19ms. Hence, recalibration amounted to 1206 15ms and fully
accounted for the 100 ms delay [from which it was statistically
indistinguishable; t(14) = 1.32, p = 0.208; one-sample t test]. In
patients, however, recalibration was significantly smaller than
in controls [t(28) = 3.11, p = 0.002; t test] and amounted to
only 53 6 16 ms (bPSE = 57 6 10 ms, rPSE = 110 6 21 ms;
Figure 3C). This implies that patients’ recalibration of a sensory
prediction was significantly impaired and reduced by 56%
relative to controls. Importantly, this group difference in reca-
libration was neither carried by nor limited to patients with
degenerative cerebellar diseases (n = 12). It was also apparent
in the remaining three subjects with acute unilateral focal
lesions: each showed a significantly smaller recalibration com-
pared to the control group [#1: t(14) = 3.55, p = 0.003; #3: t(14) =
5.21, p < 0.001; #6: t(14) = 6.69, p < 0.001; one-sample t test,
Bonferroni corrected]. Finally, we did not find any significant
correlation between the behavioral measures acquired in the
baseline experiment and recalibration (bPSE 3 rPSE-bPSE,
JND 3 rPSE-bPSE) in either group (pR 0.05).
To rule out that differences in recalibration could be ex-
plained by eye movements, we analyzed (1) eye position, (2)
velocity, and (3) number of saccades within a 400 ms time
window starting 100 ms before target disappearance (Fig-
ure 4). For each of these measures, we performed a 2 3 2
ANOVA with the between-subject-factor subject group and
the within-subject-factor experiment. In a separate set of
analyses, we additionally included the within-subject-factor
time bin, with the 400 ms epoch divided into four 100 msbins (2 3 2 3 4 ANOVA) to also account
for transient changes in eye movements.
None of these ANOVAs returned a sig-
nificant difference between groups or
interaction effects (p R 0.05; Figure 4).
Furthermore, linear regression analysesbetween each eye movement parameter and the amount of
recalibration revealed no significant correlations (p R 0.05;
Figure S3A).
Discussion
We showed that cerebellar patients and controls were equally
accurate in predicting the time of reappearance of a moving
target that temporarily disappeared behind an occluder.
However, patients were significantly impaired in recalibrating
this spatiotemporal prediction to account for a temporal delay
added in the recalibration experiment. We suggest that the
cerebellum is generally needed to keep sensory predictions
precisely tuned—even within the perceptual domain.
Previous research has highlighted the role of the cerebellum
in motor control and learning [8, 10]. This involvement in the
motor domain has often been discussed within the context
of internal forward models (FMs) [8, 9, 11, 12, 20, 21, 24–27].
FMs capture the expected sensory consequences of one’s
actions based on efference copies [4, 6] of motor commands
and enable fast and accurate movements despite delayed
or missing sensory feedback [17, 28]. Accordingly, cerebellar
lesions lead to less predictive control of motor behavior
[11, 25–27], a finding that could also explain various clinical
symptoms [8]. Moreover, its characteristic crystalline circuitry
implicates the cerebellum in establishing and updating FMs.
The cytoarchitecture of a cerebellar microcomplex allows it
to adjust the transfer of information from its mossy fiber inputs
to its output structures in response to a teaching signal
provided by climbing fibers in a temporally precise fashion
[29–31]. A microcomplex could thereby learn to mimic the
input-output characteristic of any neural system with which it
shares common input [9, 28]. Such circuitry seems ideal to,
for instance, form a predictive model of the motor plant and
to recalibrate this FM to account for the plant’s changing
Figure 4. Comparison of Eye Movements between Patients and Controls
To rule out that the observed difference in recalibration was due to eye
movements, we tested for group differences in horizontal eye position,
eye velocity, and the number of fixational saccades, respectively. Specif-
ically, we ran ANOVAs with the factors group and experiment (and time
bin). There were no significant group effects or interactions (p R 0.05; the
respective significance of each main factor is depicted in each panel;
n.s. = not significant). This is further supported by the box plots for the three
eye movement parameters shown here. There are no differences between
patients (light gray) and controls (dark gray). The central red bars reflect
the median of each measure, the vertical extent of each box captures the
range between the 25th (Q1) and the 75th (Q3) percentile, and the whiskers
extend to extreme values [except putative outliers ‘‘+,’’ i.e., values > Q3 +
1.5 (Q3 2 Q1) or < Q1 2 1.5 (Q3 2 Q1)]. Note that putative outliers were
not excluded from statistical comparisons. See also Figure S3.
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933properties (due to fatigue, aging, or disease), with the efferent
motor command as common input, the predicted sensory
action consequences as an output, and the prediction error
as a teaching signal [28]. Other studies further highlight the
role of the cerebellum in the acquisition and updating of FMs
relevant for the perceptual distinction of self-produced versus
externally produced sensory events [5, 9, 24, 32]. Finally, the
cerebellum also enables learning to predict an upcoming
sensory event based on other (predictive) sensory information
in order to trigger appropriate responses and reflexes in a
temporally precise fashion [31, 33–35].
All of the aforementioned evidence can be generally under-
stood as a cerebellar contribution to the learning of predictive
models related to motor behavior—preliminarily supporting
the view of the cerebellum as a motor structure [19]. But
although such learning is clearly needed in the motor domain
to guarantee accurate performance, it is also required to
precisely tune predictions to the statistics of the ‘‘sensory
environment’’—even if predictions are solely restricted to the
perceptual domain. Given the cerebellum’s circuit properties
and its interconnections also with cerebral areas engaged in
higher-order perceptual processing and spatiotemporal
awareness (e.g., posterior parietal cortex) [22, 23], we hypoth-
esized that the cerebellum could guarantee the updating of
sensory predictions across domains, i.e., also in nonmotor
tasks. Our patients’ deficit in recalibrating a spatiotemporal
prediction for perception clearly supports this notion. Such adomain-general learning mechanism could likewise explain
other nonmotor impairments of cerebellar patients, e.g., in
processing predictive sequences [36, 37] or in forming ‘‘cogni-
tive associations’’ [38].
Given the characteristic properties of cerebellar processing
[9, 24, 30, 31, 36, 39], our results could bemore specifically ex-
plained by patients’ inability to adjust the timing of a sensory
prediction to account for the experimentally induced predic-
tion error in the temporal domain. Alternative explanations,
such as a recalibration of perceived target speed or space
(occluder width), appear to be less likely also because these
parameters were experimentally fixed and thus perhaps
more resistant to adaptive changes due to their higher relative
reliability [40]. Ultimately, however, our experiment cannot
distinguish the detailed level (or levels) at which recalibration
occurred. However, and more important for our interpretation,
our task design aimed to restrict recalibration to the sensory
domain, in that the perceptual decision in our task did not
depend on any motor component.
Onemight argue that amotor component was still needed to
signal subjects’ perceptual decision. However, this response
was made only after the target had reappeared and therefore
could not interfere with the formation of the sensory predic-
tion. In addition, we tried to exclude any indirect motor effects
resulting from eye movements by instructing central fixation.
Moreover, we made sure that any residual eye movements
did not differ between patients and controls. We also could
not detect any correlation between eye movement parameters
and the amount of recalibration irrespective of a subject group.
This is not to say, however, that there are no oculomotor def-
icits in cerebellar patients. Rather, the oculomotor demands
of our experiment—namely, central fixation—prevented the
oculomotor deficits of our patients from surfacing [41]. Finally,
the fact that both groups performed equally well in the baseline
experiment further rules out impairments in basic processes
such as timing, motion processing, or attention that potentially
could have likewise explained the observed recalibration
deficit in cerebellar patients (Supplemental Discussion).
Comparable baseline performance rather raises the ques-
tion of whether the cerebellum is needed at all for storing
predictive models of the type required in our task. Seemingly,
in all of our patients (with the possible exception of one or two
putative outliers; Figure S2) the cerebellum was needed only
when predictions required updating. While several patient
studies probing sensory predictions in the perceptual domain
have reported similar results [5, 7, 42], many other studies in
the motor domain also report general FM deficits in baseline
performance [25–27]. This discrepancy could be explained
by differing task requirements. For instance, it could be that,
in the earlier set of studies and in our own experiment, intact
baseline performance could simply be explained by an addi-
tional representation of a predictive model in cerebral cortex
that supports these more cognitive tasks [28]. In fact, several
studies imply a representation of predictive (mental) models
in posterior parietal cortex [43–45], and it has been suggested
that these models—as opposed to those in the cerebellum—
support aspects of sensory prediction more closely related
to consciousness [43]. The cerebellum’s particular role in
such a context could instead be the unconscious fine tuning
of sensory predictions.
The posterior lobe of the cerebellum seems a likely candi-
date for the recalibration of sensory predictions relevant
for the perceptual domain [24, 32]. This agrees with our study,
in that the three patients with focal cerebellar lesions all
Current Biology Vol 23 No 10
934suffered from acute damage to the posterior cerebellar lobe,
the commonly affected region being lobule VIII in the left
cerebellar hemisphere.
In conclusion, we propose a domain-general role of the
cerebellum in fine tuning predictive models.
Supplemental Information
Supplemental Information includes three figures, one table, Supplemental
Discussion, and Supplemental Experimental Procedures and can be found
with this article online at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2013.04.027.
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